FRONTIERELE UE : IMPOSIBIL DE APARAT

Au trecut 21 de ani de cand UE a decis sa renunte la frontierele interne in cadrul asa-numitei "zone Schengen". Victimele de la Paris ale teroristilor islamici de anul trecut si cele din Berlin de anul acesta sunt in egala masura si victimele celor care au conceput si semnat acordurile Schengen. Libertatea de circulatie neingradita de controalele frontaliere practicate inainte vreme de fiecare stat membru a dat posibilitatea teroristilor sa intre nestingheriti in tari ca Franta, Italia sau Germania si sa le paraseasca tot atat de usor dupa comiterea unor asasinate in masa.

Problema securizarii frontierelor UE este insa mult mai grava si mai complexa, in acelasi timp. Astfel, intr-o lucrare de seminar din 2010 despre frontiere pregatita ca parte a studiilor mele masterale in geopolitica si relatii internationale de la Toulouse, ajungeam la concluzia deloc linistitoare ca granitele uniunii sunt imposibil de aparat si/sau securizat.

Evenimentele recente - mai ales afluxul masiv  de refugiati de anul trecut si atacurile teroriste care l-au acompaniat - mi-au dovedit validitatea concluziilor la care ajunsesem in studiul amintit  mai sus. In fapt, frontierele externe ale Europei au fost aparate cu adevarat numai in timpul Imperiului Roman. Sarcina securizarii frontierelor impotriva migratiilor barbare a fost doar partial acoperita de Imperiul Bizantin, care nu a putut impiedica insa valul popoarelor migratoare care s-au stabilit intre secolele V-X in vestul, centrul si sudul Europei.

Dupa o scurta perioada de relativa acalmie, care a acompaniat procesul de formare al statelor medievale, Europa s-a vazut  confruntata timp de cinci secole cu pericolul invaziilor si cuceririlor otomane. Expansiunea relativ rapida a acestui imperiu asiatic a adus armatele turcesti la 1683 la portile Vienei, adica nici mai mult nici mai putin la jumatatea distantei pe cale terestra dintre Istanbul si Dover !

In partea  de vest a Europei,  statele medievale spaniol si francez au trebuit sa faca fata expeditiilor militare  intreprinse de cuceritorii arabi, care au putut fi invinsi numai cu mare greutate.

In centrul, estul si sud-estul Europei, procesul de stopare a expansiunii armatelor otomane si eliberarea popoarelor subjugate de acestea a durat doua secole - intre 1700 si 1900 - si a necesitat eforturi militare sustinute din partea Imperiilor Habsburgic si Tarist. In legatura cu aceste actiuni de anvergura, as mentiona totusi faptul ca ponderea eforturilor militare anti-otomane  a apartinut in proportie de 70 la suta Imperiului Rus.

Ca fost granicer in anii 70, mi-am dat pe deplin seama ca granitele terestre ale Europei erau de fapt securizate si la acea data tot de rusi, in varianta statala sovietica adoptata de acestia dupa 1917. Cu alte cuvinte, fara protectia armatelor si granicerilor rusi - Rusia fiind singurul stat care si-a aparat si continua sa isi apere eficient propriile frontiere terestre - toate celelalte state europene sunt de fapt la discretia oricarui val migrator dinspre Eurasia si incapabile, din diferite motive, sa le faca fata. In realitate , interesul geostrategic vital al Europei este si va ramane acela de a avea in est un stat eurasiatic puternic ca Rusia.

Mai ingrijorator este insa faptul ca UE s-a dovedit recent incapabila sa isi securizeze macar frontierele maritime de la marile Egee  si Mediterana, cu consecintele pe care le cunoastem cu totii si asupra carora nu cred ca mai este cazul sa insist.

REUNIUNE 'CLUB MED' LA ATENA

Intalnirea la nivel inalt din 9 septembrie a reunit la Atena pe liderii Greciei, Frantei, Italiei, Maltei, Ciprului si Portugaliei. Obiectivul lui Tsipras este crearea unui bloc al statelor UE de la Mediterana (Portugalia este exceptia, inlocuind Spania, care de un an de zile nu are guvern) . Acesta ar urma sa prezinte un front comun la summitul UE de luna aceasta de la Bratislava, unde se va discuta viitorul uniunii post-Brexit.

Poreclit in deradere de catre germani "club Med", grupul incearca adoptarea unor pozitii comune in privinta migratiei si austeritatii, dupa modelul oferit de grupul de la Visegrad (Polonia, Ungaria, Cehia si Slovacia).

In opinia lui Schaeuble, "cand liderii socialisti se intalnesc, nu se decide nimic inteligent". Manfred Weber, seful popularilor din parlamentul european, a cerut in schimb Atenei sa implementeze reformele decise cu ocazia acordarii noilor imprumuturi ...

La summitul de la Bratislava Germania se va vedea asadar confruntata de doua grupuri de state din centrul si sudul continentului, Visegrad 4 si "Club Med", opuse multor politici mandatate de conservatorii germani. Angela Merkel a ramas cu un singur aliat de nadejde, Klaus Iohannis, care a fost convocat tot saptamana asta la Berlin pentru a primi indicatiile necesare :)

http://www.dw.com/en/greece-calls-for-pro-growth-policies-at-club-med-summit/a-19540356

MITUL POLITICII EXTERNE "FEMINISTE"

Acesta a fost lansat de Margot Wallstrom, numita ministru de externe in Suedia acum doi ani. Nu stie nimeni exact in ce consta aceasta politica externa "feminista", autoarea nu a elaborat pana acum o teorie pe tema asta...

Exista insa printre specialisti conceptia gresita - in opinia mea - ca liderii de stat de sex feminin promoveaza pacea, evitand conflictele militare. Francis Fukuyama, spre exemplu, considera ca " o lume cu adevarat matriarhala va fi asadar mai putin conflictuala decat aceea in care traim in prezent". Teoria ca teoria, pe noi istoricii practica ne ghideaza.

O. Dube, o cercetatoare de la universitatea din Chicago, a publicat recent un studiu care dovedeste ca intre secolele XV si XX in Europa, reginele au fost mai belicoase decat regii perioadei.

Alti cercetatori au subliniat deasemenea faptul ca in secolul XX femei aflate la conducerea statelor moderne - Indira Gandhi, Golda Meir, Margaret Thatcher, Chandrika Kumaratunga - au declansat si participat la conflicte militare soldate cu mii de morti.

Sa nu uitam apoi de rolul activ in declansarea razboaielor din Kosovo sau Libia jucat de H Clinton sau de glorificarea ingerintelor militare la experta Anne Marie Slaughter, fosta directoare la departamentul de stat american.

In concluzie, prezenta femeilor la conducerea statelor nu pare sa atenueze pericolul razboiului, nici sa conduca la o lume mai pasnica : sorry again, Fukuyama !

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/-foreign-policy-clinton-may-thatcher-women-leadership/497288/

AM CREZUT SI EU IN POTENTIALUL UE

Intre 2002 si 2012 am crezut in sansa UE de a deveni o confederatie de state nationale interesate in pace si prosperitate economica, un adevarat model pentru restul lumii. M-am inselat. Prioritatea numarul unu a devenit dupa 2009 promovarea austeritatii bugetare in statele membre, nu cresterea economica sau combaterea somajului ...

In anii 90, vidul de securitate creat dupa prabusirea URSS si Tratatului de la Varsovia m-a determinat sa fiu in tabara suporterilor intrarii Romaniei in alianta. Au fost preferate atunci de nataraii administratiei Clinton (Strobe Talbott si M Albright) state care au complicat enorm situatia geostrategica a NATO in estul Europei (republicile baltice). Dupa episodul cu Ucraina, s-a evaporat si iluzia unei uniuni care mentine si promoveaza pacea pe continent.

Tot in anii 90 am fost pentru introducerea monedei comune, stiind ca este vorba de un proiect francez. Mi-am imaginat ca nu poate fi nimic rau ca state cu performante economice similare (Germania Franta, Austria, Benelux) sa aiba nu numai o piata comuna, dar si o moneda comuna. Nu am crezut insa nici un moment ca vor adopta moneda euro si grecii, spaniolii sau italienii !

Nu mi-am imaginat in 1997 - cand am participat la Londra la o conferinta pregatitoare pentru introducerea euro - ca Germania isi va impune tristul prag al deficitelor de 3%, cel care a creat imense probleme dupa criza din 2008. Ba chiar am pregatit un material pentru participantii la conferinta, in care atrageam atentia ca adoptarea acestui prag va pune in pericol intregul proiect in caz de criza, dar cine sa asculte la opiniile unui roman ?

In legatura cu viitorul UE, avertizam intr-un comentariu din 1998 pe cititorii Business Week de peste ocean ca federalismul nu este o optiune viabila pentru organizarea viitoare a uniunii. Acum, cand UE este in pragul destramarii, chestiunea federalizarii UE a fost tacit abanonata definitiv...

GEOPOLITICA ROMANIEI

Interesul intelectual in geopolitica globala si cea regionala l-am avut inca de pe bancile facultatii. Dezinteresul, chiar ostilitatea autoritatilor comuniste, pentru aceasta disciplina stiintifica - care a fost profund discreditata de geopoliticianul german Karl Haushofer, inspirator al politicilor expansioniste naziste - m-au impiedicat insa pana in anii '90 sa revin si sa aprofundez demersurile mele initiale.

In ultimele doua decenii ale secolului trecut, geopolitica a revenit insa in forta in prim-planul demersurilor intelectuale care incearca sa explice modificarile teritoriale aparute pe harta lumii, aparitia de noi state sau cauzele conflictelor etnice sau religioase care insangereaza inca zone intregi ale globului.

Revenit in tara dupa 1989, m-am preocupat intens timp de cativa ani de problemele economice, institutionale si intr-o mai mica masura politice din Romania post-decembrista. Aceste eforturi au culminat cu elaborarea unui eseu dedicat geopoliticii Romaniei, “Romania in mileniul III”, care a fost prezentat in toamna lui 1995 in cadrul unei mese rotunde organizate cu guvernul Romaniei de catre revista The Economist din Londra, si publicat in presa romaneasca in noiembrie al aceluiasi an de ziarul “Ziua”.

Eseul avea la baza doua idei forta . Prima se referea la faptul ca din punct de vedere geopolitic mentinerea actualei capitale la Bucuresti era o mostenire anacronica din perioada Vechiului Regat, aranjamentul ideal pentru un stat cu forma geometrica a Romaniei impunand in mod firesc mutarea capitalei in centrul tarii, adica in Transilvania. Asa cum se poate constata din lectura pasajului urmator apartinand fondatorului geopoliticii americane Nicholas Spykman, forma Vechiului Regat prezenta serioase dezavantaje, teritoriul sau fiind lung si ingust. Forma teritoriului este in principal responsabila pentru desprinderea unor teritorii ca Bucovina si Nordul Ardealului din trupul tarii sau aparitia statului Moldova si numai in al doilea rand Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov, care nu a facut altceva decat sa exploateze lipsa de prevedere a guvernantilor romani care dupa Marea Unire nu au mutat imediat capitala intr-o pozitie centrala ce le-ar fi permis o mai buna administrare a tarii si strangerea legaturilor cu zonele periferice ale statului reintregit:

“Este evident ca forma ideala a teritoriului unui stat este cea a unui cerc perfect. Intr-o asemenea configuratie, cea mai mare suprafata posibila ar fi inclusa in interiorul frontierelor cele mai scurte, facilitand apararea acestora, iar toate zonele ar fi echidistante si s-ar afla cat mai aproape posibil de un guvern pozitionat in centrul cercului. Statele care sunt inguste si lungi ca forma - si asta este mai ales situatia puterilor terestre - au tendinta inevitabila sa se dezintegreze, fie pierzand teritorii la periferie unde influenta centralizatoare a guvernului se face cel mai putin simtita, fie prin desprinderea unor teritorii si reaparitia acestora sub forma unor state separate.” (Nicholas Spykman, Geography and Foreign Policy, 1938, p.34)

A doua idee forta era aceea a reorganizarii statului roman sub forma unui stat federal, care ar fi atenuat tensiunile existente dintre diferitele regiuni istorice ale tarii. Adoptarea formulei statului national unitar dupa 1921 nu a reusit sa previna doua decenii mai tarziu importante pierderi teritoriale la periferia statului roman.

Din nefericire, imperativele geografice care ar fi trebuit luate in seama cu prioritate de politicienii romani au fost, din nou, ignorate cu desavarsire. In goana dupa imbogatire rapida, alesii nostri au renuntat sa se preocupe in vreun fel de viitorul tarii, fiind obsedati numai de viitorul financiar al propriilor familii.

Daca se doreste insa supravietuirea pe termen lung a statului roman – lucru de care am ajuns sa ma indoiesc in ultima vreme – orice reorganizare administrativ-teritoriala a Romaniei trebuie sa aiba ca prioritate zero mutarea capitalei tarii in centrul acesteia. Procedand altfel, Romania va ramane in continuare expusa pericolelor separatismului, iredentismului si proastelor legaturi administrative dintre centru si teritoriile periferice ale tarii.

Doresc sa inchei postul cu un al doilea citat din Spykman, pe care il dedic politicienilor romani afectati de analfabetism geopolitic, sau a celor consiliati de “geopoliticieni de ziua a 7-a”:

“(...) aria geografica a unui stat este baza teritoriala de unde statul opereaza pe timp de razboi, si pozitia strategica pe care o ocupa pe timpul armistitiului provizoriu pe care noi il numim pace. Acesta este factorul care conditioneaza in mod fundamental formularea politicilor statului din cauza ca este cel mai permanent. Ministrii vin si pleaca, chiar si dictatorii mor, dar muntii raman de neclintit.” (Nicholas Spykman, Geography and Foreign Policy, 1938, p.29)

CLUELESS IN LONDON

Have we entered the “age of migration” ?

Are China and India “migration superpowers” ?

Have you heard of M-7 ?

All these astounding concepts have been recently minted by Mark Leonard, Director of the London-based European Council on Foreign Relations, in a Project Syndicate article.

Comment Florian Pantazi APR 21, 2016:

Mark Leonard heads a London-based think tank which tries to emulate the much more successful American model headed by Richard Haas, the Council on Foreign Relations, whose influence is real indeed. Mr Leonard is also familiar with my blog, "Spotlight on Geopolitics" hosted by the Brussels-based Blogactiv platform.

As a Toulouse-trained specialist in IR & geopolitics, I have arrived at the conclusion that what we are currently witnessing is the end of the era of globalization:
"virtually all of today’s armed conflicts – in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Iraq or Yemen – have geopolitics as a common denominator. Even ISIS has a clearcut geopolitical agenda of sorts, namely that of establishing an “Islamic caliphate” in territories snatched from war-torn Syria and Iraq. Taken together, these tensions and conflicts among ethnic, religious or military blocs have brought to an untimely end the era of globalization and ushered in the Age of Geopolitics."("EU in the Age of Geopolitics", Jan 4,2016, http://florianpantazi.blogactiv.eu)

In my view, given the current pressure on his shoulders, M. Leonard (N.B.-link below) was trying to come up with what the French call "une grille de lecture" that could be instrumental in interpreting current developments, of which Syrian or Afghan migrations are but a small part. Naturally, in reality such migrations are the effects and not the cause of the crisis. As such, the thesis proposed by Leonard is unscientific. His "migration superpowers" do not in fact exist.

The Chinese and the Indian diasporas, for example, might appear large but as a percentage of their total populations, they are not. (The 20 million members of the Indian diaspora, for example, represent less than 3% of the total population of India. Much smaller EU nations, such as Romania, have 20% of its population living or working abroad : does this make Romania a “migration power”, overlooked by Mark Leonard ? )

During the modern era, the most successful and accomplished "migration superpowers" have been Portugal and Spain, as well as Great Britain and France. Taken together, these European nations are responsible for sending immigrants in their millions and colonizing entire continents in the New World or in North Africa. As a percentage of the home countries' populations, the migrants represented a much more consequential movement of people around the world than anything we are witnessing today. Still, to my knowledge, no historian in his right mind would have labeled that period in world history "the age of migration", but refer to it instead as the period of European world-wide expansionism. To date, I haven't heard of the Chinese, the Indians, the Kurds, the Syrians and what-have-you leaving their habitat to create new countries or settle deserted areas of the world :)

Florian Pantazi APR 21, 2016

Mr Leonard's "age of migration" thesis is, unfortunately, a total fiasco. To substantiate it, he mixes vastly different types of population movements around the world: Chinese expats working on Chinese-financed projects in Africa and elsewhere, India's economic migrants in search of opportunity, Kurds fleeing political opression in Turkey and finally, refugees from war-torn areas of the world affected by geopolitical-type conflicts (ethnic and/or religious groups fighting each other for the control of a given territory like in Syria or Libya).

For a global population of some 7 billion, the 240 million people of various nationalities living or working outside their country of origin represents roughly 3,4 percent. In other words, although global movements of people might seem impressive, the overwhelming majority of the world's population continues to live and work in their home countries.

Furthermore, by throwing Israel and ISIS into the mix, the author succeeds in muddling the issue of global migration completely. In short, I have seldom seen on Project Syndicate a more unscientific approach to analyzing a global trend, one that makes a mockery of the readers' intelligence. Consequently, the so-called "age of migration" thesis is plainly a wrong interpretation of today's developments. 

 Florian Pantazi APR 21, 2016

P.S.- I would kindly like to remind Project Syndicate readers that, in world history, there was only one "Age of Migration" - between the 5th and the 10th centuries. After the fall of the Roman Empire, ethnic groups in their entirety (from the Avars and Visigoths to the Huns, Slavs,Magyars, and so on) moved from Asia to Europe, where they mixed with local populations and gave rise to today's European nations. It is highly doubtful that an event of a similar magnitude is currently underway or that it will happen again in the foreseeable future. I do wonder, however, who Mr. Leonard's high school history teacher was :) 

Comment Petey Bee APR 21, 2016

+1

Comment Steve Hurst APR 21, 2016

The food sector is notorious for covering a dish in mayonnaise to obscure what is being served up. In this case with the dish Mr Leonard is providing for our delectation when the mayonnaise is scrapped away there is only more mayonnaise and the dish should be returned to the kitchen forthwith. Seldom have I been asked to consume anything more vacuous. The idea Mr Leonard is in any policy position other than... READ MORE

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/immigration-refugees-geopolitical-boon-by-mark-leonard-2016-04

When it comes to such intellectual performances, Professor Dimitri Kitsikis - the uncontested dean of global geopolitics - said it best:

“Dès la chute du camp socialiste, après 1989, la géopolitique est redevenue à la mode,à tel point que dans les médias et le grand public, bien des gens se prétendirent spécialistes de géopolitique et que le mot circula, sans connaissance de son sens véritable.”

UN SENTIMENT DE DEJA VU

 In 1989, Polonia,Cehoslovacia, Ungaria si RDG au reusit sa se elibereze de tutela URSS. In aceeasi perioada, Romania lui Iliescu incerca o APROPIERE fata de URSS, de tutela careia reusise se se elibereze partial in anii 70 si 80.

De doi-trei ani, guvernele Marii Britanii, Poloniei, Cehiei sau Ungariei depun eforturi sustinute pentru a-si recastiga o parte a suveranitatii nationale pierdute in favoarea conducerii politice a UE. In aceasta perioada cruciala, Romania si-a ales un presedinte infeudat total Germaniei si Bruxelles -ului, pe " dragul de Klaus", cum il dezmiarda seful comisiei europene.

La fel ca si predecesorul sau Iliescu - care inalta osanale URSS cu numai un an-doi inaintea disparitiei acesteia - Iohannis ridica acum in slavi UE si a adus chiar la conducere un guvern de "tehnocrati" condus de un fost comisar european, subordonand si mai abitir Romania unei structuri supra-statale care sta la randul ei sa se prabuseasca...

Unii dintre cititorii mei de pe Facebook s-au indoit ca lucrurile ar sta chiar asa de rau la noi, ca expertii si politicienii romani nu reusesc sa adapteze politica statului la trend-urile din regiunea noastra sau din restul Europei. Am decis deci sa recurg si la alte surse decat cele utilizate de mine, si iata ce pasaj am gasit intr-un articol HotNews din 2004:

"Pentru fostii sateliti, abia eliberati din imbratisarea sovietica, prioritara a devenit relatia lor cu Occidentul, negocierile cu Moscova vizind, in primul rind, conditiile de retragere a trupelor sovietice stationate in unele din aceste tari.
Romania a facut oarecum exceptie de la regula, urmind un traseu invers, de apropiere de Moscova, pe fondul neincrederii Occidentului fata de noua putere instaurata la Bucuresti."

Pentru cei interesati in aprofundarea subiectului, dau mai jos un link catre articolul cu pricina, cu precizarea ca eu l-am citit la o zi dupa ce am scris postul de mai sus.
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1262128-iliescu-actionat-pentru-apararea-intereselor-urss-ului.htm

TRIUMFUL DEMOCRATIEI

Un studiu recent al lui Dani Rodrik ( Harvard) si Sharun Mukand (Warwick), "The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy" din iulie 2015, explica ratiunile pentru care democratiile liberale  sunt exceptia, nicidecum regula, regimurilor democratice existente in prezent in lume.

Studiul in cauza trece in revista evolutiile politice care au avut loc dupa prabusirea zidului Berlinului. Cei doi autori subliniaza astfel faptul ca  numarul statelor democratice a depasit, pentru prima data in istorie, numarul de state non-democratice. Se poate asadar afirma ca democratia a triumfat, devenind un sistem politic cu adevarat global.

Autorii disting insa intre doua tipuri de democratii : democratiile electorale si democratiile liberale .   Majoritatea democratiilor protejeaza  minimum doua dintre trei tipuri de drepturi : dreptul de proprietate, drepturi politice si drepturi civile. 

Democratiile electorale protejeaza numai dreptul de proprietate si drepturile politice ale majoritatii (organizarea de alegeri libere si existenta competitiei politice) dar nu si drepturile civile (egalitatea de sanse si in fata legii) pentru minoritatile etnice, sexuale sau religioase. Acest tip de democratie este intalnit peste tot in lume, din Ungaria si Polonia, pana in Pakistan, Mexic, Ecuador sau Turcia.

Democratiile liberale, specifice statelor vestice, respecta toate cele trei tipuri de drepturi, inclusiv drepturile civile ale minoritatilor. Aceste democratii sunt insa exceptia de la regula, aparitia lor fiind facuta posibila de existenta unor conditii specifice prealabile, ca  liberalismul intelectual, statul de drept sau societati civile mature in statele vestice unde s-au dezvoltat.  "Ceea ce este surprinzator nu este numarul limitat al democratiilor liberale, ci insasi existenta lor" (D. Rodrik)

Contributia principala a studiului consta in decuplarea conceptului de democratie de acela de liberalism, ceea ce usureaza intelegerea evolutiilor politice din secolul nostru. As adauga faptul ca agenda extinderii numarului de democratii de tip liberal in lume este una exclusiv americana,  care serveste anumite interese de grup asupra carora nu doresc sa insist aici si care pare sortita unui esec de proportii.

http://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/the_political_economy_of_liberal_democracy.pdf

EU IN THE AGE OF GEOPOLITICS

At the beginning of the year, it has become customary for ‘pundits’ to make predictions about forthcoming developments which might affect the global economy, elections in leading countries or international relations. From my part, I would like to take my readers back in time, in an attempt to make today’s armed conflicts around the world easier to understand.

This approach is all the more necessary as virtually all of today’s armed conflicts – in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Iraq or Yemen – have geopolitics as a common denominator. Even ISIS has a clearcut geopolitical agenda of sorts, namely that of establishing an “Islamic caliphate” in territories snatched from war-torn Syria and Iraq. Taken together, these tensions and conflicts among ethnic, religious or military blocs have brought to an untimely end the era of globalization and ushered in the Age of Geopolitics. But where did it all start ?

Over the past sixty years, specialists and the European general public were led to believe that geopolitics died together with Nazi Germany and was replaced with the ideological confrontation between the capitalist and communist worlds commonly referred to as the Cold War. Yet by the 1970s, as the confrontation apparently led to a stalemate, geopolitical-type conflicts again started to prove their usefulness for policymakers intent on destabilizing their opponents’ camp.

In Europe, conflicts of a geopolitical nature were rekindled by stealth courtesy of the United States. Thus, during the seventies the Ceausescu regime, fearful of being axed by the Soviets following the Prague Spring, was encouraged to denounce the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and pushed some of the country’s historians into demanding the return of Bessarabia within Romanian borders. That geopolitical conflict is still very much alive today, with Romania, the EU and the Russian Federation involved in a tug-of-war confrontation over the future of the Republic of Moldova.

As it turned out, in the end the Soviets lost their post-WW II domination of Central and Eastern Europe following a decade of cooperation between the CIA and the Vatican – which led to the formation of the Solidarnosc trade union movement and the organization of free elections in Poland – and not as a result of the geopolitical, USA-backed proxy confrontation between the Ceausescu regime and Moscow.

Following the fall of the Berlin wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union, geopolitical conflicts have made a spectacular return to Europe, in Yugoslavia. The separation of Slovenia and Croatia, the two Catholic regions of the Yugoslav federation, is likely to have been requested to the Western alliance by the Vatican as a reward for its successful assistance in undermining the Soviet Union during the eighties. It is also very likely that US strategists did not in fact plan for the total destruction of the Yugoslav federation, but for a diminished one, after which Serbia could be allowed to control the remainder of the territory. As events unfolded, however, the Macedonians and Albanians also decided to secede, spelling the end of the Yugoslav state.

Since 2001, the US has openly embarked on a drive to stoke geopolitical conflicts in places around the world where it wanted to expand or consolidate its hegemony. In Europe this drive led to the 2004 colour revolutions in Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia, as well as the 2008 Georgian war, and culminated in 2014 with the toppling of the elected government of Ukraine by the CIA-backed Maidan movement.

In the Arab world, the US and some of its European allies like France and the UK gave full backing to armed groups involved in the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, or in the civil war in Syria, sometimes in alliance with Saudi Arabia and/or Turkey. The Russians and the Chinese have either been largely neutral in these conflicts or have sided with the embattled Syrian regime, which for more than four years is fighting some of the most dangerous terrorist groups on the planet.

For the EU, the price to pay for the US’ post-cold war geopolitical forays in Eastern Europe and the Arab world is staggering.

Already affected by years of stagnation after the 2008 financial crisis, EU countries have lost tens of billions of euros in trade with Russia, following the Washington-dictated sanctions against this country which prompted the Russians to reply in kind. At least ten billion euros more is the likely cost for resettling the 1 million Syrian refugees within the EU, an amount that does not include the 3 billion euros promised by the European Commission to Turkey so far, in a futile effort to convince this country to stem the flow of Europe-bound refugees.

Geopolitics as a field of study can not only provide us with a better understanding of what is at stake in today’s conflicts, but also with some insights into what the future could bring.

In the Middle East, the Sunni-Shia confrontation between the region’s main powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, is likely to continue for years to come. We are in all likelihood entitled to expect that the Alawite minority in Syria will establish its own separate state, as are the Kurds from northern Iraq and parts of today’s Syria, much to the chagrin of Turkey. The rest of the Syrian territory and possibly parts of Iraq will probably emerge as a new Sunni state entity, as sectarian conflicts will prevent the continued existence of Syria and Iraq in their current form.

For the European Union, Ukraine is poised to play the same role as Afghanistan in the demise of the Soviet Union. The unwise decision to back American neocon planners will thus backfire and hasten the EU’s own demise in the process. The main catalyst for its undoing are the nationalistic movements gaining in strength, from the UK and France in the West, to Hungary and Poland in Central and Eastern Europe. The continent is already back to barbed-wire fences not only in Ukraine, but also in Hungary, Austria and Germany – a trend that will mean the final collapse of the Schengen area in the following years, if not as early as 2016.

All these developments combined suggest one thing. Namely that, when compared to Russia, China or the United States, the European Union is the worst-equipped entity to survive in the age of geopolitics and deal with its consequences.